This global cross-national study seeks to build upon earlier studies that have tested the impact of constitutional provisions upon state human rights behavior. I examine across a twenty-year period the impact of constitutional provisions for six individual freedoms and four due process rights on state abuse of the right to personal integrity Here I find statistical evidence that some constitutional provisions do matter, even when controlling for democracy and for other factors known to influence human rights behavior. While none of the constitutional provisions for individual freedoms is statisticallysignificant, two of the due process provisions (provisions for fair and public trials) do decrease substantially the likelihood that states will abuse their own citizens' human rights. The other two due process provisions, which have become almost universal, the ban against torture, and the writ of habeas corpus, are quite disappointing in that they do not produce the expected impact. Over the long term, the trial provisions would lead to a decrease of about one level in the personal integrity abuse score, which is only somewhat less than the impact produced by other variables in the model, such as population size.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of some Eastern Block states have led to a n unprecedented wave of newly drafted constitutions, many of which incorporate bills of rights or individual provisions aimed at protecting human rights. As of March 1997, 1 8 4 of the world's nation-states had promulgated formal constitutions, most of these being new creations (Flanz 1997) . As 1993, more than 1 0 0 states had written bills of rights (Blaustein 1993) . Some of these bills of rights surpass even that of the United States i n depth and breadth Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2002) : pp. of their protections (see Schwarzer 1994) . This wave of constitution writing follows upon a period of near universal acceptance of an internationally recognized set of minimum standards. The standards are set forth in two documents, often referred to as the International Bill of Rights: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Scholars argue that these documents represent broad consensus that there is, in fact, a "core set of human rights to which all humanity aspires" (Ibhawoh 2000: 838 and 843, emphasis added; also see Donnelly 1999; Linz 1992; Martin 1991) . Many of the newly drafted bills of rights in post-colonial and former communist states explicitly incorporate the rights set forth in these international documents.
For many, these trends represent substantial progress and they engender considerable potential for future human rights protection. This optimism stems from the general belief that the best way to safeguard individual freedoms is through the enumeration of rights, which extends the reach of the rule of law and provides individuals protection from the abuse of government power (see Beatty 1994; Rosenthal 1990) . Presumably regimes are less willing to abuse rights that are clearly and publicly promised to their citizens in a legally binding document and that are supported by constitutional mechanisms, such as an independent judiciary Even if constitutions do not serve as a charter of these fundamental rights, they may still serve as a "binding statement of a people's aspirations for themselves as a nation" (Murphy 1993: lo) , and ultimately may foster the conditions under which a regime would give in to demands for these fundamental protections. History, of course, has shown that many constitutions, such as those of communist regimes, have often been mere "window dressing" rather than substantive protection for individual human rights. Howard (1991: 3) argues that in many of the world's countries, the constitutions are "worthless scraps of papers." While the world's constitutional experts have been busy advising newly independent states and emerging democracies how best to provide constitutional protections to their citizens, it appears that little scientific analysis has been conducted that would support their advice or facilitate the creation of new constitutions. Such analysis would allow us not only to identify which elements of law work, but also would allow us to determine under what circumstances or conditions these elements work best. This article attempts to build upon recent constitutional studies by examining, across two decades and a global set of countries, the question of whether constitutions make a difference in state human rights behavior. This article also builds upon the growing body of literature that seeks to explain state abuse of the right to personal integrity.
Constitutions are argued to be "the most important legal document for a nation that subscribes to the rule of law" because they define the relationship between the nation's people and their government (Siegan 1994: 72) . Specifically, constitutions impose constraints upon government and protect the individual's freedoms from arbitrary or abusive state action (see Andrews 1964; Finer 1974; Stotsky 1993; Siegan 1994; Elster 1993; Finer, Bogdanor, and Rudden 1995) . The constitutional enumeration of such rights as those under study here is believed to be the most important safeguard of the individual's freedoms (see Rosenthal 1990 ). This enumeration is expected to improve states' human rights practices in two ways. First, constitutions provide concrete standards against which the regime's behavior can be assessed not only by itself, but also by the public and the world community (see Sartori 1962; Andrews 1964; Murphy 1993) . Additionally, such provisions, and constitutions generally, may articulate ideals and norms to which the regime aspires (Sartori 1962; Andrews 1964; Finer 1974; Murphy 1993; Finer, Bogdanor, and Rudden 1995) , and they may "powerfully shape popular culture" (Epp 1998: 13) . In this sense, constitutions, and bills of rights in particular, may serve as a socializing tool that conditions the expectations of the public, promoting the development of a rights consciousness among the people (see Epp 1998; Martin 1991; MacGuigan 1965; Murphy 1993) . Referring to bills of rights generally, James Madison asserted that "political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion" (Madison 1977: 298-99) . In regard to the Canadian Bills of Rights, MacGuigan (1965) has argued that the bill of rights' real contribution was, in fact, the way in which it served as a stimulus to increase Canadian rights consciousness and to further the development of such rights.
Despite these theoretical expectations concerning constitutions, some scholars (including some of the ones mentioned above) remain somewhat skeptical about the actual influence of constitutions in the real world. They note significant instances where constitutions have been dishonored or ignored to the extent that they were either reduced to "worthless scraps of paper" or "convenient screens" for tyrants to hide behind (see Sartori 1962; Andrews 1964; Howard 1991; Resenbrink 1991; Friihling 1993; Murphy 1993; Schwarzer 1994; and Epp 1998) . Other scholars such as Safran (1981) and Ludwikowski (1996) point out that in many constitutions these personal freedoms are afforded protection only within the boundaries of the state's law and therefore may be modified by statutory law. Additionally, in some constitutions there has been an equal if not greater emphasis placed on the individual's duties to the nation. For example, in the constitutions of socialist states, bills of rights were the norm; however, they were usually juxtaposed next to a list of duties that were considered inseparable from the list of rights (Ludwikowski 1996: 227) . Many constitutions also stipulate that any guaranteed rights must not be detrimental to the nation's best interest or the public good. Thus, the level of protection promised by constitutions may be rather limited. These concerns have led some scholars to ask if constitutions can ever be more than the mere "parchment barrier" that James Madison sought to avoid. Ultimately, this is an empirical question, one that has not been examined fully by political scientists or legal scholars.
In part, both the skepticism and the lack of empirical attention to the question of whether constitutions matter are linked to the behaviorist dismissal of formal institutions generally (see Sartori 1962: 199, and March and Olsen 1984) . However, in political science there has been a renewed interest in institutions beginning with Powell? groundbreaking study, Contemporary Democracies, that examined the impact of numerous institutional factors that affected regime performance in regard to citizen participation, government stability, and political violence. Numerous comparative studies have followed Powell's work, examining the impact or performance of various institutional arrangements across democratic systems (e.g. Lijphart 1984 and Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Shugart and Carey 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993; Linz 1994; Bohrer 1997) . The wave of democratization at the close of this century has further increased the scholarly attention to institutions. The recent empirical interest in the relationship between constitutions and human rights behavior follows upon this resurgent interest in institutionalism. Prior to the end of the Cold War only two empirical studies looked at whether constitutions make a difference in regard to state human rights behavior, but with the recent period of constitution writing, the number of empirical studies have increased, as has the level of scientific rigor.
EMPIRICAL ASSESSING PT(OVISIONS

STUDIES THE IMPACTOF CONSTITUTIONAL
The first known empirical study of constitutions and human rights is BoliBennett's (1976) bivariate analysis (comparison of means), which examined states' human rights behavior in 1975 and found little correlation between his human rights violation indices and his indices of rights and duties, with only one exception. Contrary to expectations he found that the countries that less severely violated human rights were those in which the rights were more constitutionally restricted. ' Pritchard's (1986) bivariate analysis of states' human rights behavior in 1974 produced counter-intuitive results in that greater constitutional protections were associated with lower levels of human rights pr~tection.~ Blasi and ' Boli-Bennettk measure of human violations is taken from an unpublished manuscript by Winona
Hubrecht. It appears to be a simple categorization based on Amnesty International reports (the categories do not conform to any of the published variations 1 have seen). Her measure of human rights violations is somewhat problematic in that it combines civil and political rights with economic rights as a single ~ndicator. Theoretically one might expect that these rights are not a single dimension of human nghts but rather could be separate and competing dimensions of human rights. Ensuring quality of life may sometimes lead to the restriction of civil Cingranelli's (1996) bivariate study of human rights in 1993 is the first post-Cold War study that assesses the impact of constitutions on human rights behavior; however, their study focuses on constitutional provisions, which are not themselves direct promises of freedoms and rights. Rather they are institutional provisions that theoretically would be expected to facilitate the provision of human rights: an independent judiciary and a federal system of government. Overall, their study finds only a weak direct link to the constitutional provisions. Blasi and Cingranelli's study has limitations similar to the two previous studies: it encompasses only a single year and is not a multivariate model that controls for the numerous factors known to influence human rights behavior. Two recent studies offer more rigorous statistical analysis of this question.
Davenport's 1996 study of 39 countries across a 35-year period ) is the most rigorous and comprehensive analysis to date. He identifies and analyzes four types of provisions of a constitution that may affect human rights behavior: (1) constitutional provisions that explicitly mention rights; (2) constitutional provisions that explicitly limit rights; (3) state of emergency clauses; and (4) restrictions on emergency suspensions of constitutional rights. Using Taylor and Jodice's (1983) negative sanctions as a measure of political repression, he analyzes the impact of these provisions whle controlling for level of democracy, domestic conflict, and economic de~elopment.~ He finds only three (out of fourteen) statistically significant relationships: (1) the constitutional promise of freedom of press reduces the likelihood of negative sanctions; (2) the constitutional restriction of press increases the likelihood of negative sanctions; and (3) a state of emergency clause produces a negative impact on negative sanctions. While some constitutional provisions do demonstrate an observable effect on repression, their impact is less than constitution-makers probably would expect. Davenport's analysis is well executed and his findings are clearly relevant to the analytical purposes of this article. But, as Davenport notes, his sample of countries is rather small and not fully representative of the world. In addition, his dependent variable is arguably a less severe level of rights abuse than the abuse of personal integrity rights that are under study here. Finally, because of limitations on the availability of his dependent variable measure, Davenport's analysis terminated well before the extensive and intensive development of constitutions that has occurred during the Third Wave of democratization and the post-communist era.
Cross's (1999) study assesses the impact of constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and of judicial independence upon human rights behavior and political nghts. Additionally, as Davenport (1996) points out, she also does not control For the fact that some constitutions allow nghts to be overridden constitutionally, Davenport summarizes negative sanctions as "censorship (the limnation of news media) and political restrictions (various constraints placed upon individual citizens and political parties)" (1996, 636) . in 54 to 58 countries. He finds no statistically significant relationship with his constitutional provisions measures but does find that judicial independence increases the probability of political rights and of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Cross's effort to analyze the impact of judicial independence and constitutional provisions on human rights is commendable. However, there are several aspects of his study that urge caution when drawing conclusions. First, the two dependent variables in the analyses are either an average of each country's Freedom House political rights during the 1980s or Humana's measure of search and seizure protection. Averaging across a decade is highly questionable in the area of human rights, where there can be great fluctuation from year to year. Second, his measure of judicial independence and search and seizure practices are the subjective rating of the late Charles Humana (1992) that provides no replicable operationalization of either ~a r i a b l e .~ Finally, his study is also limited to small sample of countries that is not necessarily representative of the global set of countries.
While overall, the empirical studies suggest that constitutions may be less important than legal scholars and human rights activists would hope, at least two of the studies suggest that some elements of the constitutions do, in fact, decrease the odds of a state engaging in political repression or committing humans rights abuse.
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM PROVISIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND DUEPROCESS RIGHTS
Two types of constitutional protections are expected to affect personal integrity abuse: (1) the individual freedoms associated with constitutional liberalism: speech, assembly, association, press, and religion and (2) the key due process protections that directly relate to personal integrity abuse: writ of habeas corpus (the prisoner's right to be promptly informed of the charges), protection against arbitrary arrest, prohibition against torture or cruel and unusual punishment, and a fair and public trial. Both sets of constitutional protections are key elements in the internationally recognized minimum standards for human rights and are modeled after the universally accepted International Bill of Rights discussed above. The overarching research hypothesis for both sets of provisions is that they will improve human rights protection because (1) they are binding contracts between the regime and its citizens and (2) they are indicators of the regime's willingness to protect these rights or freedoms. The overarching alternative hypothesis then is that these promises may be only empty or unenforceable promises. The theoretical justification for each set of constitutional provisions is somewhat different. The constitutional provisions for individual freedoms
In fact, it is not clear whether the measure captures formal or actual judicial independence or some combination of the two.
should allow persons to openly criticize and perhaps challenge the regime or the status quo. Additionally, as Poe and Tate (1994: 123-24) suggest, these types of freedoms "may make it easier for citizens and opposition leaders to publicize attempts at repression, thereby bringing down on would-be abusive leaders the weight of majority or world opinion."
The constitutional provisions for due process provide protection against arbitrary government action that directly relates to the abuse of personal integrity rights. The writ of habeas corpus protects individuals against arbitrary or political imprisonment in that the government is usually required promptly to present evidence sufficient to justify holding a prisoner and to make known the charges leveled against a prisoner-obviously precluding the phenomenon of disappearances and limiting the practice of political imprisonment. The promise of a fair and public trial would make it more difficult for regimes to hold secret trials in which persons could be convicted for political reasons or on trumped up charges. Public trials also facilitate the dissemination of information, allowing the press and public opinion to function as curbs on repressive behavior. The ban on torture, when practiced, directly eliminates one component of personal integrity abuse and probably decreases the number of extra-judicial killings that result from torture.
The abuse of the right to personal integrity is a narrow set of human rights violations that include political imprisonment, torture, and killings or disappearances. While this set of rights does not include all of the rights promoted under the international covenants and some constitutions, it does focus on the abuses that are considered to be the most "egregious and severe crimes against humanity," and the ones that represent abuses that "are the sort that usually can be avoided" (Poe and Tate 1994: 854) . And more importantly, this set of rights covers the core rights that would have to be fulfilled in order for the provision of the other rights to be meaningful. A group of political scientists have developed and gathered data for standards-based indices that are believed to be the acceptable measure for this study: Stohl et a1.k Personal Integrity measure (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Henderson 1991 Henderson , 1993 Poe 1991 Poe , 1992 Gibney, Dalton, and Vockrell 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) . These scales measure the abuse of personal integrity rights on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing states with the least amount of abuse and 5 representing states with the highest level of abuse.5 Two
The countries are assigned a rating according to the following rules from Gastil (1980) : sets of scales have been created: one based on State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and one based on Amnesty International Reports. In the Poe and Tate personal integrity models, parallel analysis has been conducted using each of these measures. Overall, the studies of personal integrity abuse using these two measures have produced consistent results across the two measures. The analyses have led to the identification of a set of eight factors that consistently demonstrates a substantive and statistically significant impact on personal integrity abuse: political democracy, population size, economic standing, international war, civil war, and regime types-leftist regime and military regime Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith and Poe 2000; Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier 2000; Zanger 2000) . I follow Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier (2000) and employ only one of the personal integrity scales in this article-the one based on the Amnesty International reports. Focusing on one measure simplifies the presentation of results and conserves space, allowing me to extend the types of analysis conducted in this a r t i~l e .~ Because Amnesty International reports tend to leave out countries with good human rights behavior, a potential bias would arise if I used only countries on which Amnesty International reported. Therefore, consistent with Poe et al., in cases in which Amnesty International did not issue a report but the State Department did, a score gained from applying the same set of standards to the U.S. State Department reports was substituted. Gibney and Dalton (1996) . Followng Poe et al. (2001) 1 use the Amnesty International-based measure rather than the State Department-based measure. While there has been some concern of a State Department bias (i.e., anti-socialist, pro-U.S. ally), it should be noted that recent evidence suggests that State Department reports have become routinized and rellable over time, especially in the post-Cold War period (lnnes 1992, Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 1998 ) and a recent article suggests that bias is minimal (Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 2000) .
Since I am building upon previous work that examined the personal integrity models I control for the eight factors mentioned above that have proven to be statistically and substantively significant. Since these variables are described in detail in previous studies, here I only briefly summarize their theoretical links and their operationalization. For fuller details see Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) .'
Population Size: Henderson (1993) argues that states with large populations may be tempted to "resort to repression as a coping mechanism" to deal with threats that arise due to severely strained national resources and unfulfilled public needs. Additionally, Henderson argues that we must statistically control for population size since the laws of probability would dictate that as the number of persons in a country grows so would the number of opportunities for repressive actions. Recent empirical evidence has supported Henderson's hypothesis Davenport 1995a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999 , Zanger 2000 .8 The natural logarithm of the total national population is used in the model in order to deal with the skewed distribution of the population data.
Economic Standing: Expectations concerning economic standing follow those of population size. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Henderson (1991) argue that social and political tensions related to economic scarcity are likely to increase instability in the poorest countries and thus increase the probability that the regime would use repressive measures to maintain order; whereas, in wealthier countries the population will be satisfied and will be less likely to present a threat to order that would trigger repressive state action. Empirical evidence has consistently shown that higher levels of economic development reduce the probability of political repression Davenport 1995; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier 2000; Zanger 2000) . Economic standing is operationalized as the state's per capita GNP (in dollar thousand^).^ Civil War Experience: A growing body of literature has demonstrated that governments faced with internal threats often resort to political repression to restore order. Although the literature on domestic threats has mainly focused on ' These are the same data reported In Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999 except that the author has extended the dataset beyond 1993 to 1996 and has replaced the Polity I11 measure w t h the Pollty 98 measure. Henderson also hypothesized that growth in population size would increase the l~kelihood of repression. While he did find evidence of this effect in his single-year study, those results have not been found to hold up in fuller studies of human rights abuse. Rather we have found population size to be the significant factor, both statistically and substantively Despite some criticism of national GNP data (Summers and Heston 1984; Heston 1994) , GNP has continued to dominate as the most appropriate measure of economic development (Donnelly 1999, 623) . For example, see Dahl 1992 , Moaddel 1994 , Cross 1999 , Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999 . Some studies have substituted energy consumption for this measure (Henderson 1991 (Henderson , 1993 Davenport 1996, 19981 , but these data are not available consistently across a global set of countries. domestic threat or conflict as a dependent variable (e.g. Gurr 1968 Gurr , 1970 Feierabend and Feierabend 1972; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; McAdam 1982; Booth and Richard 1996; and Francisco 1995, 1996) , recent studies have demonstrated that domestic threat does increase the probability of state repression (e.g., Davis and Ward 1990; Alfatooni and Allen 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995 Davenport , 1996 Krain 1997 Krain , 2000 Moore 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier 2000) . Civil war, which poses the most serious domestic threat, is defined here following Small and Singer's guidelines for identifying instances of civil war: (1) "the government, as the central authority in a country, must be involved as a direct participant in the war" and (2) "there must be effective resistance, that is, either both sides must be 'organized for violent conflict" or "the weaker side, although initially unprepared [must be] able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities is sustains" (Small and Singer 1982: 2 15) .
International War Experience: International war is yet another serious threat which may compel regimes to resort to political repression as a tool to maintain domestic order during such a state of emergency (see Gurr 1986) . A growing body of empirical evidence has supported this hypothesis (Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Zanger 2000) . International war is operationalized following Small and Singer's (1982: 50-55 ) guidelines for where an international war is one in which "(1) there was a total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict, [and] (2) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel taking part in the hostilities" (1982: 50, 55) .
British Colonial Experience: Mitchell and McCormick argue that the colonial experiences that shaped the political culture of most states may have impacted the states' respect for human rights. In particular, they note that British colonial rule is strongly associated with the development of postcolonial democracies; whereas, other colonial experiences that presumably were more authoritarian may have left a legacy of greater human rights abuse (1988: 480) . While Mitchell and McCormick found only slight evidence to support their hypothesis and Poe and Tate (1994) found no evidence to support the hypothesis, Poe, Tate, and did find support for the hypothesis in their expanded study Countries that have been territories of Great Britain at some point during their history are coded 1 and all other countries are coded 0.
Militaty Regime: As Poe and Tate (1994: 853) note, the role of the military is one of the factors first explored by those interested in human rights-related phenomena . Military regimes are believed to be more likely to resort to repression, because armies by their nature and by habit are prepared to use force as a means of control or coercion (e.g., Huntington 1964; McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Zwick 1984; Ziegenhagen 1986; Seligson 1987; Poe and Tate 1994; and Davenport Individual Human IZlghts (1977-1996) 1995a). Empirical evidence of the impact of military regimes on human rights behavior has been somewhat weak. In personal integrity studies the results have been rather inconsistent compared to other factors. Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) examined the impact of military controlled regimes on personal integrity abuse. In these studies military controlled regimes are defined as either regimes that come to power "as a consequence of a successful coup d'etat, led by the army, navy, or air force, that remained in power with a military person as the chief executive for at least six months in a given year" (McKinlay and Cohan 1975: 1) or regimes "with either a civilian as the chief executive and several military persons in the cabinet or military head of government who nominated a civilian as the head of government and himself worked behind the scenes" (Madani 1992: 61) . Military control was not statistically significant in Poe and Tate's shorter study (1994) but was in their extended study (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) ." Davenport (1995a) , who examined a different form of repression, negative sanctions, used three measures of military influence: size of the military, military sector allocations, and direct representation of the military in the government.1° Only military sector allocations demonstrated a consistent statistically significant relationship with repression across all of his models." Here, I continue to employ the Poe and Tate measure of military regime as defined above.
Leftist Regime: Originally, political scientists hypothesized that Marxist-Leninist controlled states would be more willing to use repression to curb threats since their political ideology justified the domination of the polity in the pursuit of an ultimate political goal Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) . Initial global analysis supported this hypothesis, but only in the case of abuse as reported by the State Department, a result that seemed to suggest a possible bias in State Department reports rather than a true effect . However, when the global analysis was expanded beyond the initial eight-year period to a period of eighteen years, the evidence clearly contradicted expectations and suggested that leftist regimes were actually less likely to repress personal integrity rights than nonleftist regimes. While this result was unexpected, it is not totally counter to the original theoretical expectation. First, in leftist regimes, control of society and personal freedoms have often been so complete that the regime might be less likely to need to engage in these more severe abuses of personal integrity rights to maintain order than would be its nonleftist counterparts. Second, as Duvall and Stohl(1983) and Lopez and Stohl (1992) have argued, human rights repression may have an "'afterlife,' which affects the behavior of people long after the observable use of coercion by state lo The Banks (1991) data are not available across the global set of countnes or the complete tlme period under study here. l1 Davenport's subsequent stud~es have e~ther not continued to control for milltary influence or have not reported those results (Davenport 1996 (Davenport , 1998 (Davenport , and 1999 .
agents has ended" (Lopez and Stohl 1992: 218) . Thus, past repression in leftist regimes may actually reduce the need for future repression or the need for more severe forms of repression, such as those measured by personal integrity rights abuse. Of course, neither of these explanations is exclusive to leftist regimes. Leftist regime is operationalized as "those governed by a socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with non-socialist opposition" (Poe and Tate 1994: 858) . Leftist regime is a dichotomous variable where leftist regimes are coded one and nonleftist regimes are coded zero. Because of the conflicting expectations for this measure, it is assessed in this article at the most strenuous two-tailed test of significance. Political Democracy: Democracy has consistently been shown to strongly reduce the likelihood of various forms of political repression (for example, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988 Henderson 1991; Fein 1995; and Davenport 1995a and Davenport , 199513, 1996 and Davenport and 1998 including the abuse of personal integrity rights Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier 2000; Keith and Poe 2000; and Zanger 2000) . Theoretical explanations of the nexus between democracy and repression have tended to focus either on institutional and structural characteristics andlor the values and norms in democracies. Political scientists argue that democratic principles emphasize bargaining, compromise, and elections as the appropriate or only fair means to resolve disagreements (e.g., Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991; Poe and Dixon 1994; Rummel 1997) . These norms socialize democratic leaders to resolve conflict through non-violent means. Political institutions reinforce these norms, but more importantly, scholars argue that political institutions provide the tools for the public to hold government officials accountable for their actions (e.g., Gurr 1986; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Dixon 1994; Rummel 1997; Zanger 2000) . For example, with fully participatory and competitive elections, a potentially abusive leader might feel vulnerable to public discontent at the polls and thus be curbed from abusive practices. Or a potentially abusive leader could be curbed by a system of checks and balances that place judicial or legislative constraints on the executive's powers.
When studying the relationship between human rights and democracy political scientists must carefully define and measure democracy in order to prevent a tautology in describing this relationship.12 Poe and Tate (1994: 856) suggest that in order for democracy to "function as an independent explanation for state l 2 Some scholars have expressed concerns that some elements of democracy, elections In particular, may in certain circumstances be positively related to political represslon (Herman and Brodhead 1984; Beckett 1987; Hayward and Kandeh 1987; Weiner and Ozbudun 1987; and Booth and Seligson 1989) . Recent cross-nat~onal stud~es have not supported thls concern. Davenport (1998) found that national elections tend to decrease negatlve sanctions, regardless of the pollticat-economlc context but Richards (1999) found no effect of elections on repression.
terrorism and the abuse of personal integrity, it must be defined in terms or procedures and rights that do not themselves preclude repression" and "must be defined in terms that allow independent operationalization of the concept." Following Poe and Tate (1994) and other studies of personal integrity abuse, I use a definition of political democracy that primarily captures the institutional and structural aspects of democracy that are most appropriate here. Political democracy is defined as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected officials" (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 76) .13 Three measures of democracy have been used in personal integrity rights models. In Poe and Tate's (1994) first study they employed Vanhanenk (1990) index based on voter turnout and party competition. For cross-validity they conducted a parallel analysis with Freedom House's political rights measure. In their 1994 study Poe and Tate had noted that the Polity I1 (Gurr 1990 ) measure of institutionalized democracy would have been their ideal measure of democracy. They were unable to use the measure, however, because it had not yet been expanded to encompass the entire time period covered in their study. In their extended study, Poe et al. (1999) were able to switch to the preferred Polity measure of democracy, using Polity I11 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) . Again, they conducted a parallel analysis with the Freedom House political rights index. Here, I use the most recent Polity measure of democracy, Polity l 3 There may be some concern that these constltutional provisions, whlch represent constltutional Ilberalism, overlap w t h the concept (and my measure) of democracy. In post Cold War period, scholars have been particularly interested In disentangling the concepts of (and expectations concerning) constitutional liberalism and political democracy Schmitter (1992) asserts that while the concept of constitutional liberalism may have coincided with the nse of democracy, "it has never been Immutably or unamb~guously linked to its practice." Zakaria (1997) distinguishes clearly the two concepts. He argues that the essence of democracy has always been rule of the people whlle the essence of constitutional liberalism has always been the natural (or 'inalienable') rights of human belngs secured agalnst government Intrusion under basic law (26). He argues that constitutional llberallsm ". . . is not about the procedures of selecting government, but rather government's goals It refers to the tradition, deep In Western history, that seeks to protect an lndividualb autonomy and dignlty against coercion, whatever the sourcestate, church, or society" (25). Zakaria further argues against defining democracy so broadly as to Include an exhaustive list of social, political, economic, and religious nghts, because such elevation "turns democracy into a badge of honor rather than a descript~ve category" and "renders ~t analytically useless" (25). As evidence of this dichotomy, he points to the rising number of democracies in the world today that in fact do not practice constitutional liberalism but rather are what he calls "illiberal democrac~es." Of course, it remains possible that political democracy would be highly correlated w t h constitutional liberalism, although, Zakaria's and Huntington's analyses of democracies and actual liberalism in 1990s certainly cast doubts on the probab~lity of such a correlation. It should also be remembered that my study measures protectlons that are written In documents as opposed to the actual fulfillment of these protectlons. Statistical diagnostics, in fact, demonstrated only minor correlation between the Individual const~tutlonal measures and the democracy measure used here.
98.14 The choice of the Polity measure is also consistent with other recent studies of personal integrity abuses (Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999; Zanger 2000) and negative sanctions (Davenport 1995b (Davenport , 1995c (Davenport , 1996 (Davenport , and 1998 ). Polity's institutional democracy indicator is an 11-point additive index coded along four dimensions using the following rules:
Competitiveness of Political Participation: competitive (3), transitional (2), and factional (1) A recent study (Gleditsch and Ward 1997: 380) examined empirically the components of the Polity measure (Polity 111). Their analyses demonstrated that the measure is primarily driven by its executive constraint dimension and that the other dimensions, which measure patterns of executive recruitment and the extent and competitiveness of participation dimensions, were "not especially powerful in determining the degree of democracy." They concluded that to use the data "summarily to classify modern polities as democracies directs attention away from the actual data that have been collected on authority patterns." Thus, they urge scholars to move beyond discrete classification of "democracy" or "autocracy" and to focus more on the subdimensions of this measure. Personal integrity studies do not use the Polity data as a dependent variable and not do use the data to divide countries into two discrete categories, but rather use the index to measure the level of institutional democracy attained in the country While other human rights studies have continued to employ the composite measure rather than the individual components (e.g., Davenport 1998; Milner, l4 In order to simpl~fyand facilitate the presentation of the analysis I have chosen to use only one measure of democracy for this study. I have chosen to drop the Freedom House measure in thls analysls for several reasons. It has been cntic~zedfor being "highly lmpresslonlstic, belng no more than an estimate by a person who has collected a lot of seemingly relevant information on all of the countries of the world (McCamant 1981, 132) . While the measurement has Improved over tlme and is considered, less impressionist~c(see Poe and Tate 19941 ,the measure does Include one dimension that may overlap with the behavior captured in the dependent variable (see Poe and Tate 1994) . Additionally, the measure is counter-intuitive In that the small score represents a higher a level of political nghts and the higher score a lower level of rights. The results produced with thls measure have performed nearly identically to both the Vanhanen measure and the Pol~ty measure I did run the full model with the Freedom House measure and the results generally held Poe, and Leblang 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Zanger 2000) , I decided to conduct an additional parallel analysis to examine, as Gleditsch and Ward suggest, the effects of the subdimensions in my model.
Constitutional Promises and Restrictions Variables
The key constitutional liberties and protections include: (1) freedom of speech; (2) freedom of association" (3) freedom of assembly; (4) freedom of press: (5) freedom of religion; (6) the right to strike; (7) writ of habeas corpus (defined as the requirement that government promptly present evidence before a judge or magistrate sufficient to justify holding a prisoner and to make known the crimes with which a prisoner is being charged); (8) public trial; (9) fair trial; and (10) ban of torture or cruel and usual punishment. I have coded the level of constitutional provision as: explicit guarantee or mention in the constitution 2; explicit guarantee or mention in the constitution but notes exceptions or qualifications, such as a public interest clause 1; no mention in the constitution 0.'5 This operationalization is similar to that Blasi and Cingranell(1996) who measure "absolute" or "conditional" constitutional guarantees.16 The data sources for these variables are Blaustein (1993) and Flanz's (1997) Constitutions of Countries of the World. Flanz's series contains English translations of most current constitutions of the world and in most cases contains information on past constitutions as well.17 I have built a data set that is pooled across both time and space (between 154 and 178 nation-states, depending upon the year). Political scientists l5 When coding the constitutions I found nearly a dozen constltutions that restncted the constitutional protection in such a way that the provision would not apply to polltical opposition. For example, in Algeria (1977-81 ) the promise of freedom of speech and assembly does not apply to speeckdassembly against the revolutionary cause and in Albania the promise of freedom of speech, association, assembly, and press do not apply 11 there are in opposition to the socialist order. Since these clauses go well beyond public interest clauses, I have originally coded the variables as 0. I have flagged the variables so that I may adjust these codings as is necessary during my analysis. l6 I chose not to follow Davenport's strategy of creating for each freedom a separate dichotomous variable to denote constitutional "promises" and constitutional restrictions because it is likely that these two measures share variance, thus reducing the statistical slgnlficance of the variables.
l 7 There has been some difficulty in accessing all of the old reports In this series. This publication is organized as series of looseleaf binders in which the outdated materials are removed from the looseleaf volumes and replaced by updated pages. Oceana Publications does not keep old copies and only one U.S. university had the foresight to keep the older copies. I have been able to borrow the volumes that Bryn Mawr had kept. Because they did not start their collection untll around 1984, I was not able to get all old constitutions going back to 1976. Therefore I do have some missing years of constltutions, but relatively few, especially given that my data set contains 3738 country-years The early years of the data set contain the most mlssing data on the dependent variable.
such as Stimson (1985: 916) have noted that this design "can be an extraordinarily robust research design, allowing for the study of causal dynamics across multiple cases, where the potential cause may even appear at different times in different cases" (p. 916). The pooled cross-sectional design eliminates the small N problem of many comparative studies, producing in this case a data set with an N of 2,552 country-years. Two statistical problems are inherent in this particular design-the threat of heteroscedasticity from the unit effects and the threat of autocorrelation from the time dimension, both of which may lead to the problem of unreliable tests of statistical significance and inferences (see Stimson 1985; Ostrom 1990; Beck and Katz 1995) . Following Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) , I deal with the problem of heteroscedasticity by using Beck and Katz's Panel Robust Standard Errors (Beck and Katz 1995) . Current statistical software (StataCorp 1999:362) allows me to compute the Panel Robust Standard Errors using an unbalanced data set (StataCorp 1997: 619) . To deal with the problem of autocorrelation, I have also included a lagged dependent variable to correct for autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995) .18
Preliminary analysis indicated that multicollinearity could be problematic in regard to four of the constitutional provisionsthe freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly.19 I tested a variety of approaches to ameliorate this problem and ultimately chose to deal with it by constructing an index that combined the four problematic variables into an additive index, the Four Freedoms Index. Since initial bivariate and multivariate analysis suggested that some of the relationships of the constitutional provisions were signed in opposite directions, See Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck et al. (1993) for a more complete description and justification of this approach. The inclusion of this vanable is not only statistically justified but also theoretically justified since it has been shown that regimes tend to use past decisions as a baseline for present declslons (W~ldavsky 1984) .
lY Analysis of the correlation between each palr of variables suggested that four of the variables may be problematic: speech, assembly, association, and religion. Freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are correlated at .81 wh~ch is beyond the .80 limit set by Lewis-Beck (1980, 58-62) . Association and assembly are correlated at .77 and speech and association are correlated at .77. Religion and assembly are correlated at .63 and religion and association are correlated at .68. While these pairs do not surpass Lewis-Beck's .80 cutoff, the correlation is high enough to merit some concern; therefore, I ran Klein tests (each independent variable is regressed upon the others) on each of these vanables. While the R-square of each regression is well below 1.0 as suggested by Lewis-Beck, the r-square for speech on assembly is .66, which suggests that high multicollinearity could still be a problem. The tests for the relationship between religion and assembly and between religion and association are low enough to suggest that multicollinearity may not be a problem (r-squares ranging from .39 to ,451. The relationship between association and assembly and between speech and association fell into a fuzzy zone with r-squares, ranging from .59 to .60.
I was reluctant to construct a single additive index that combined the full set of ten constitutional variables. This caution was justified in tests of such an additive ten-variable index; the index produced coefficients that were signed in the unexpected direction. Therefore, I ruled out the use of the full ten-variable index. I decided that a more acceptable solution to the multicollinearity problem would be to construct a limited index that combined and isolated only the four problematic variables, which individually had produced negative coefficients in preliminary analysis. Such an index would not mask as many relationships as the ten-variable index did.
The results of the analysis from the full model are reported in Table 1 . None of the variables denoting the six individual constitutional freedoms is statistically significant. The Four Freedoms index is signed properly, producing a small coefficient (-.01), but is statistically significant only at the .22 level. The other individual freedom provisions (freedom of the press and the right to strike) produce coefficients that are signed in the wrong direction and thus cannot be considered statistically significant. The due process variables fare better than the individual freedoms measures; two of the four due process provisions are statistically significant. The public trial provision produces a rather small coefficient (-.03) that is statistically significant at the .04 level. Thus, a change from a constitution that does not include any provision for public trials to one that includes qualified provision or full provision of public trial would lead to an initial change of .03 or .06 respectively in the level of personal integrity. The fair trial provision produces a larger coefficient (-.12) that is statistically significant at the ,0001 level. A change from a constitution that does not include any provision for fair trials to one that includes qualified provision or full provision of fair trial would lead to an initial change of .12 or .24 respectively in the level of personal integrity The other two due process provisions produce coefficients that are signed incorrectly and cannot be considered statistically ~ignificant.~~ 20 I continued to explore other possibilities. I conducted an additional analysis that controlled for overly restrictive constitutional provisions. As I had coded the constitutions it became clear that some constitutional promises were restricted well beyond the standard "public welfare" caveats that increasingly appear in constitutions. A small set of constitutions denied using these freedoms against the revolutionary or socialist orderlinterest. For example, Albaniai communist constitution says that the freedoms may not be exerc~sed in opposition to the socialist order, and Iraq's constitution says that the exerclse of freedoms must comply with the revolutionary trend. These restrictions may be so extensive that they render the promises useless or they may actually legitimize the abuse of such rights. To control for this possibility I created a dummy variable to mark these country years (0 if the constitution contained one of the above clauses), and then I used a dummy variable as a multiplier for these countries, which converted the vanables to zeros. I also created a multiplier where the overly restrictive constitutions were coded (1) instead of zero. I then duplicated each of the above analyses and produced results that were almost identical to previously reported results. Thus, the impact of these more restnctive clauses is not readily observable. 1examined one additional possibil~ty: that there was not enough variation in the 10 measures of *Main entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients, generated using STATA 6.0. The robust standard errors, which were used to control heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
Overall, the control variables perfonn as they have in previous studies. Each of the control variables is statistically significant at the ,0001 level, except for military regime and British colonial experience, which do not achieve acceptable levels of statistical significance once the constitutional variables are added to the model. These results are not surprising since these two variables performed weakly and somewhat inconsistently in previous studies as well. Civil war produces the second largest impact in the model, an increase of .48 in the level of personal integrity abuse when a country moves into a period of civil war. The impact of a change to international war produces a smaller change than does civil war, an increase of .20 in the level of personal integrity abuse. As in previous models, economic standing produces a small positive impact (coefficient of -.Ol) that is basically equal to zero when one considers that the measure is computed in dollar thousands. For example, it would take an increase in per capita GNP of $20,000 to produce a .20 decrease in the level of repression. Political democracy produces a seemingly small coefficient (-.04), but an increase from the lowest level of democracy to the highest level of democracy would produce an initial impact of -.40 in the level of personal integrity abuse.
In deference to the concerns raised by Ward and Gleditsch (1997) that were discussed earlier, I have included a test of the disaggregated measure of democracy Those results are reported in the second half of Table 1 .The substantive and statistical performance of the constitutional variables and the control measures is identical to that achieved in the analysis using the composite measure. Two of the four components of the democracy measure produce statistically significant relationships: constraint on the chief executive and the competitiveness of political parti~ipation.~' Executive constraint produces a coefficient of -.03 (p < .03) which means that a one unit change in executive constraint would produce a .03 change in the level of human rights abuse. However, a maximum change from unlimited executive power to executive parity or subordination to the legislative or judicial branches would produce a decrease of .12 in the level of abuse. While Ward and Gleditsch's analysis revealed that the Polity democracy measure was largely driven by executive constraint, in this analysis another component is much more powerful-the competitiveness of political participation (coefficient of .09 p < .0001). A maximum change in this variable from zero (suppressed political participation) to three (competitive elections) would produce a change of -.27 in the level of repression. The two components that capture the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment are not statistically significant. Not constitutional provisions to merit more than a d~chotomous measure for each provision. I recoded the data where all 2s were coded 1. 1 achieved the same results with these d~chtomous variables and thus chose to report the results using my original coding. 21 Identical results were produced in the Poe-Tate model with the constitutional variables removed from the model. surprisingly, the combined maximum impact of the two components (.39 ) is approximately equal to that achieved by the composite measure (.40) achieved in the first analysis. Regardless of the construction of the democracy measure, its impact is one of the largest in the model. I conducted one final set of analyses to include interaction variables in the model. Davenport's study had found important interactions between some of his constitutional provisions and conflict. He found that when national constitutions explicitly protect freedom of press and domestic threats occur, the state will generally engage in lower levels of repression than those states that face domestic threats without the explicit constitutional provision for this freedom. The interaction between the other individual freedoms and threat were not statistically significant. Following Davenport, I tested for interaction between the two levels of conflict included in my model (civil war and international war) and the constitutional provisions. The results of these analyses are included in Table 2 . 1 first tested the interactive effects with the civil war measure. These results appear in the first half of the table. The public trial and fair trial provisions remain statistically significant even when controlling for the interactive effects. The coefficient for fair trial remains the same (-.12) but the coefficient for public trial increases somewhat (from -.03 to -.05). Only one of the interactive measures achieves statistical significance-the interaction between freedom of press and civil war. When a state has a national constitution that provides for freedom of press and the state experiences civil war, the state is less likely to abuse human rights than a state experiencing civil war that has no such constitutional provision. Even though the level of conflict analyzed here (civil war) represents a more severe threat to the regime than does the level of conflict measured by Davenport (general strikes, antigovernment demonstrations, guerilla warfare, and riots), the relationship observed by Davenport holds. The results of the interaction variables for international war are reported in the second half of the table. None of these interaction variables is statistically ~ignificant.~~ Thus, it appears that when the regime is threatened by conflict from outside its borders, the regime's survival may trump its constitutional commitments.
Because of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in my model, the independent variables in the model are expected to produce, through that variable, an additional impact on human rights behavior for several years. In Figure  1 , I depict the overtime effect (from time, to time,-,,) of substantial changes in 22 These results hold when all of the interactive variables are combined into a single model. Only the interaction between freedom of press and civil war is statistically significant. The impact of public and fair trial remains consistent with the other models.
CONFLICT PopulNbn (leg) each of the independent variables in the model that achieved statistical significance at least at the .10 level. With the exception of two variables (per capita GNP and population) maximum change in the independent variable from time,, to time, is assumed-for example, a change from being the highest to the lowest level of dem~cracy*~ In the case of per capita GNP a change of $20,000 dollars is assumed and in the case of population a change of ten million people is assumed. For ease of comparison, the figure assumes that each of the independent variables causes a decrease in human rights abuse.
In Figure 1 we can see that the over-time effects of each of the variables become asymptotic by the tenth lag. A change from a constitution with no *' The effect at time, is the coefficient multiplied by the maximum variation possible. For example, the maximum amount the public trial variable can vary is twogoing from a score of 0 for no protection to a score of 2 for maximum protection. The effect of the changes at time ,+, is calculated by multiplying effect of the change at time, by the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable and adding the effect of independent variable at time ,+,.
provision for public trial to a constitution with explicit provisions for fair trials will produce, ceteris paribus, an initial impact of .06, that levels off at .17 by the tenth lag. The impact of adding the fair trials provision to the constitution is substantially larger, a change of .66 by the tenth lag. If we look at the combined impact of the two constitutional provisions we see an over-time improvement in human rights of almost a full level (-.83). The impact of terminating a civil war (and staying at peace) reduces personal integrity abuse by .48 initially and by 1.32 at the tenth lag-the largest over-time impact. Termination of involvement in an international war produces a much smaller impact, beginning at .20 and leveling off at .55 by the tenth lag. Democracy produces the third largest impact; a country that progresses from a score of zero to a score of ten on the democracy index would eventually see an impact of 1.10, ceteris paribus. The effect of a reduction in population by 10 million persons produces the largest impact, a decrease of 1.35 in human rights abuse.24 The effect of a gain of $20,000 in per capita GNP produces the smallest impact, a decrease of.55 by the tenth lag.
It should be remembered that the theoretical changes that are inferred here in order to calculate the over-time effects assume the maximum variation. Because of differing operationalization of variables, some variables have a tremendous range for variation-population and per capita GNP, for example. Thus, the potential for variation increases their estimated over-time effect. Variables that are dichotomous have a very limited range for change, and thus their over-time impact will be smaller than the effect that can be achieved with variables that have a full range of variation. And often assuming substantial variation in those variables with a full range of variation is much less realistic than assuming a change of state in the dichotomous variables. For example, the task of increasing a state's per capita GNP by $20,000 (an amount approximately equivalent to the size of Canada 's GNP in 1996) or reducing the population size by ten million would be rather difficult to achieve compared to writing constitutional provisions into law. Certainly, the willingness of the state to allow these actions or to take steps toward producing them would be necessary in order to bring about any of the three changes. However, the willingness of the state to take action might not be sufficient to bring about such a reduction in the population (unless we assume genocide) or such an increase in the per capita GNl? Thus from a practical point of view, pursuing better human rights through constitutional law offers greater potential than pursuing it through other less manipulable factors. 24 Obviously, an Increase in population is the more likely scenario and it would be expected that such a sudden increase would produce a 1.39 increase in human rights abuse. But again, in order to compare the overtime effects side-by-side, we must base the impacts upon the same assumptionproducing a decrease in human rights. Unfortunately, the ease of comparison creates a somewhat theoretically implausible scenario ulth this variable.
The purpose of this article was twofold: (1) to expand, across two decades and across a global set of countries, the empirical examination of the impact of constitutional provisions on states human rights behavior, and (2) to build upon the existing body of literature that seeks to explain state abuse of the right to personal integrity While this study has identified two important factors to add to the list of known factors that improve the likelihood of a state protecting the right to personal integrity, the empirical test of the impact of these ten constitutional provisions is somewhat discouraging, given the effort at global constitution building. In particular, the assessment of the impact of the constitutional promise of the five basic freedoms (speech, assembly, association, religion, and press) and the right to strike on human rights abuse is not very optimistic. None of these provisions produced an observable improvement on human rights behavior. The constitutional provision for freedom of press did demonstrate the expected relationship when the model controlled for the interactive effects with civil war. Countries that face civil war and have a constitutional promise of freedom of press are, indeed, less likely to abuse human rights than a state experiencing civil war that has no such provision. Future studies that continue to examine the relationship between these promises and human rights practices should examine the role of judicial independence and legislative constraints on the executive, particularly in regard to internal and external threats.
The analysis of the due process provisions produced perplexing results in regard to the two variables most closely related to personal integrity abuse (the ban on torture and the promise of the writ of habeas corpus). While the levels of statistical significance for these measures are quite high, the coefficients are signed in the wrong direction. Clearly, if I had tested these variables with a 2-tailed level and not predicted a direction, the variables would have been statistically significant. However, there is no theoretical justification to suggest that these constitutional promises would increase the likelihood of political repression. Two of the due process provisions were substantively and statistically significant-the provisions for public and fair trials. The impact of simultaneously adopting both of these constitutional provisions is fairly large. Within ten years, the state should experience an improvement of approximately one level in personal integrity scores, ceteris paribus. These two factors are inherently more manipulable than the other factors known to influence states' abuse of personal integrity rights-civil war, international war, population size, economic development, and political democracy-and thus from a policy perspective, may offer a more feasible path to pursue in regard to human rights. Thus, while overall the impact of constitutions may be less than would be expected by legal scholars or hoped for by human rights activists, the results of this study suggest that constitutions do matter more than would be expected by their critics. It is clearly premature to dismiss the role of constitutions in the realization of personal integrity
